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In February of 2005, the UNDP Drylands Development Center (UNDP-DDC), the 
CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) and the 
International Land Coalition (ILC) jointly hosted an expert consultation to explore the 
challenges of designing and implementing a drylands tenure reform program (see 
http://www.undp.org/drylands/lt-workshop-05.htm).This workshop was followed by an e-
conference on the same topic organized with FRAME (see http://www.frameweb.org/). 
Securing tenure was identified by a wide range of participants from different parts 
of the world as a prime objective of any drylands tenure reform.
1 
We want to thank our co-organizers and the participants of these events for 
pointing us in the right direction. 
A special thanks also to Regina Birner, Marilyn Hoskins, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick 
for their valuable comments and suggestions. We appreciate Amanda Segovia’s 
expeditious efforts in accessing reference materials from various libraries. 
                                                 
1 Other crucial issues facing drylands resource users today that were identified by workshop participants 
include market access, support from state structures, unfettered participation of local actors, global climate 
change, the spread of small arms and ammunition, refugees and internally displaced people associated to a 






Close to one billion people worldwide depend directly upon the drylands for their 
livelihoods. Because of their climatic conditions and political and economic 
marginalization drylands also have some of the highest incidents of poverty. Pastoral and 
sedentary production systems coexist in these areas and both very often use common 
property arrangements to manage access and use of natural resources. Despite their 
history of complementary interactions, pastoralists and sedentary farmers are increasingly 
faced with conflicting claims over land and other natural resources. Past policy 
interventions and existing regulatory frameworks have not been able to offer lasting 
solutions to the problems related to land tenure and resource access; problems between 
the multiple and differentiated drylands resource users, as part of broader concerns over 
resource degradation and the political and economic marginalization of the drylands. 
This paper discusses enduring tension in efforts to secure rights in drylands.  On 
the one hand are researchers and practitioners who advocate for statutory law as the most 
effective guarantor of rights, especially of group rights.  On the other side are those who 
underscore the complexity of customary rights and the need to account for dynamism and 
flexibility in drylands environments in particular. It explores innovative examples of 
dealing with secure access to resources and comes to the conclusion that process, rather 
than content, should be the focus of policy makers. Any attempt to secure access for 
multiple users in variable drylands environments should identify frameworks for conflict 
resolution, in a negotiated manner, crafting rules from the ground upwards, in addition to 
a more generalized or generic identification of rights. Elite capture and exclusion of 
women and young people continue to pose significant challenges in such decentralized 
processes. For rights to be meaningfully secured there is need to identify the nature and 
sources of threats that create insecurities.  
 
Keywords: Drylands, secure access, land tenure, customary rights, natural resources, 
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 BITING THE BULLET: HOW TO SECURE ACCESS TO DRYLANDS 
RESOURCES FOR MULTIPLE USERS 
 
 
Esther Mwangi and Stephan Dohrn 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This review explores how tenure security can be enhanced for drylands resource 
users. The past decade has seen a renewed interest among donors, researchers and 
practitioners in drylands development. Drylands, which comprise the arid, semi-arid, and 
dry sub-humid regions of the world, cover more than 40 percent of the earth’s land 
surface, supporting almost 20 percent of the human population (Thomas et al. 2002). In 
Africa alone, drylands (excluding deserts) cover 40 percent of the land surface and 
support an equal proportion of Africa’s inhabitants (Anderson et al. 2004). Drylands 
contain most of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Mortimore 1998): 12 of the 
world’s 20 most disadvantaged countries are in dryland Africa. The world’s poorest 
women are located in Africa’s drylands and it is the women who produce, manage and 
market most of the food for their families and societies, and who work directly with 
natural resources.
2 
While the contribution of drylands and their populations to national and global 
economies and values are understated, their potentials for livestock development, wildlife 
and tourism, mining, solar and wind energy, etc. are clearly recognized (Anderson et al. 
2002). But the populations living in these ‘marginal’ areas continue to face declining 
social and economic conditions (McCarthy and Swallow 1999). The donor-supported, 
                                                 
2 See statement of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in observance of the World Day to Combat 




national government-led technical solutions of the 1960s and 70s such as range 
rehabilitation, water development, de-stocking, veterinary programs and livestock 
marketing interventions have failed (Sandford 1983). These were primarily targeted at 
subsistence pastoral production systems with the objective of increasing productivity and 
controlling environmental degradation.  Although most of these projects failed to achieve 
their intended goals, many of them had positive spin-offs for local people.  The logic of 
local people might not be compatible with that of development projects and those who 
promote them.
3 
Similarly, the state-led institutional interventions of the 1980s that focused either 
on nationalizing and/or privatizing drylands resources have been consistently described 
by scholars and practitioners as ‘dismal failures’. Yet again these were targeted primarily 
at pastoralists. The outcomes anticipated by these top-down interventions often perceived 
as the silver bullets to solve all problems were not realized: pastoralists continue to 
‘overstock’ beyond what external experts considered the rangelands’ ‘carrying capacities’ 
and they continue to pursue, albeit at increasingly smaller scales, extensive livestock 
systems, shifting herds between wet and dry season pastures. Furthermore, they have 
sustained institutions that support their production systems, which hardly bear much 
resemblance to the state or market dichotomies that were imposed upon them. The silver 
bullet of land tenure reform that was intended to set in motion livestock destocking, 
increased market offtake and rangeland conservation missed its target. 
                                                 
3 A project that installed a pastoral zone in Kénédougou Province in Burkina Faso, for example, attracted 
between 1975 and 1983 pastoralists from neighboring provinces not because they wanted to become 
sedentarized and follow the principles of group ranching but because the financial and technical support of 
the project allowed them to safe their livestock after droughts (Nelen et al., 2004). The question therefore 
becomes whose criteria are set for the measurement of success and whose objectives are followed. A 
number of examples for the lack of understanding of local knowledge and of the logic of pastoral 




These events have been captured in a substantial, and still growing, literature.
4 
Innovative ways of thinking (and doing) in the drylands are now emerging. The drylands 
are increasingly recognized as the domain of multiple groups pursuing diverse production 
strategies (pastoralism, agropastoralism, cultivation). Multiple institutional forms have 
evolved from within to sustain the complementarities and manage the often conflicting 
strategies even as external influences from states and markets pose increasing challenges. 
The focus among researchers, donors and practitioners appears to have shifted. Local 
institutions and solutions finally do seem to get the needed attention. Tenure and access 
options of differentiated local actors to drylands resources and opportunities do matter. 
Securing these options in a highly variable environment now matters the most.  
Because the drylands are characterized by a diverse set of users (pastoralists, 
cultivators, hunter-gatherers, refugees, etc), and variable and erratic climatic conditions, 
flexibility to accommodate these diverse uses at different times is crucial. Yet each of 
these users must be assured of appropriate and effective access to sustain their diverse 
livelihoods strategies. Enhancing tenure security thus presents a unique dilemma to the 
drylands where variability, flexibility and multiple uses are the defining characteristics.  
This paper first presents a brief account of the features of drylands focusing on the 
complexities of economy, politics and environment that have structured current processes 
in the drylands. It draws out the rediscovered and increasingly touted notions of 
variability, flexibility, and opportunism that underpin production systems in the drylands 
and that are not conducive to one-size-fits-all or silver bullet solutions. This section also 
                                                 
4 See, for example, IIED, 2002; Lund, 2002, 2001, 1999; Salih et al., 2001; Toulmin and Quan, 2000; 
Niamir-Fuller, 1999; Anderson and Broch-Due, 1999; Lane and Moorehead, 1994; Mortimore, 1998; 
Basset and Crummy, 1993; Downs and Reyna, 1988; Baxter and Hogg, 1987; Horowitz and Little, 1987; 




introduces the two main groups of resource users (pastoralists on the one hand, and 
cultivators or farmers on the other) and their production systems focusing on their 
relations and interaction in a shared space. 
The second section develops the elements of a drylands tenure reform program 
appropriate to secure access to resources for multiple users and uses. It draws from 
innovative examples in different settings, including urban settings, in an attempt to 
explore how secure tenure can be promoted and enhanced for drylands resource users. 
Although not providing final answers to these questions the evidence discussed suggests 
that in multi-user or multi-use environments such as the drylands, the focus of tenure 
regulation needs to shift from substance, i.e. the allocation of rights themselves, to 
process, i.e. rules and mechanisms for regulating access and use among multiple 
interests. Nonetheless the determination of both substance and content must originate 
from the resource users.  
 
2.  THE DRYLANDS: ENVIRONMENT, PRODUCTION STRATEGIES AND 
RESOURCE TENURES 
Most of the world’s drylands share similarities of low and variable rainfall (which 
introduces risk into life-supporting systems), fairly high social and natural diversity and 
striking consistency in the use of common property arrangements for resource 
management and access (Mortimore 1998). Using Africa’s drylands as an example, this 
section highlights key features of drylands environments, the diverse strategies of 
drylands resource users, and principle resource tenure issues, with which individuals and 






Large proportion of Africa are drylands, receiving less than 1000 mm of rainfall 
per year in less than 180 days, the remaining months being relatively or absolutely dry 
(Mortimore 1998). High temperatures during the rainy season cause much of the rainfall 
to be lost in evaporation; and the high intensity of storms ensures that much of it runs off 
in floods. For securing human livelihoods the two dominant characteristics of drylands 
are aridity and variability. In terms of aridity, many places normally have little or no rain 
for six months or more. Consequently species are adapted to drought stress, with plant 
and animal biomass production heavily concentrated in the wet season. Not all areas, 
however, are limited by water. There are pockets of wetlands in drylands such as the 
Fadamas of Northern Nigeria, the Dambos of Zambia and Zimbabwe, river flood plains 
or margins of lakes (Hulme 2001; Mortimore 1998). These offer valuable dry season 
grazing, flood recession farming, or irrigation opportunities. 
Apart from being low and seasonal, rainfall is also variable, both interannually 
and seasonally. Variability introduces risk into plant and animal production. Droughts, 
however defined, are a characteristic feature of this environment. Seasonality constrains 
pastoral specialists to move herds. Rainfall variability is at the root of uncertainty or risk 
in dryland ecosystems. The mobile systems of livestock production seem to provide an 
efficient way of exploiting such environments. Rainfall variability also poses critical 
challenges for farming communities in the semi-arid zones, and plays an important part in 
defining the technological challenges which agriculture must meet if communities are to 
support themselves from the land. 
This focus on climatic variability departs from earlier successional models of 




densities and vegetation productivity. Carrying capacity, land degradation, over-stocking 
and even desertification were terms associated with traditional African rangeland 
management systems, and the objective of intervention was to limit stocking densities in 
tune with plant biomass. The usefulness of these views of rangeland function have been 
widely discredited (Behnke et al. 1993; Behnke 1994; Niamir-Fuller 1999; 1995) and are 
increasingly abandoned for more holistic models that reflect the realities of African 
rangelands (and even Asian rangelands see Fernandez-Gimenez 2002; Sneath 1993; 
1998; Banks 2003; Ho 2000). While the new rangeland ecology may yet call for greater 
empirical testing, it more closely reflects the opportunistic strategies of mobile herders 
constrained by erratic seasonal and interannual rainfall. Mobility allows herders to exploit 
multiple niches distributed across space, at different times to depress fluctuations in 
production (Kamara et al. 2004; Kamara 1999; Goodhue and McCarthy 1999). This is 
supported by a number of studies (Scoones 1994; Swallow 1994; Toulmin 1995), which 
found that the boundaries of grazing areas or of transhumance corridors as well as group 
membership are ill-defined or “fuzzy”. This fuzzyness is believed to be a positive factor 
in the functioning of the pastoral systems.  It is crucial in ensuring access to critical 
resources such as pastures and water during times of scarcity. Goodhue and McCarthy 
(1999) for example demonstrate that traditional access systems with their fuzzy nature 
produce more stable and higher returns than well-defined private property rights. 
However, the need for fuzzy spatial and social boundaries in highly variable 
environments is at odds with the requirement for social and spatial exclusion that scholars 
of common property have indicated to be a prime consideration for sustainable resource 




translating these rediscovered ideas (like fuzziness, variability, stability, diversity, and 
vulnerability) into viable policies and programs (Batterbury and Warren 2001). 
 
DRYLANDS RESOURCE USERS 
Pastoralists in the drylands 
Pastoralism is a dominant strategy for the use of Africa’s drylands. In a recent 
review of policy lessons from various studies on pastoralism in eastern Africa and Asia, 
Fratkin and Mearns (2003) summarize the evolution of policy. Earlier development 
policy for pastoral regions held one view in common: that rangelands were suffering 
from degradation caused by overgrazing of domestic animals, due to animal increase. 
Though available, technological options to combat this problem were seen as constrained 
by pastoralists’ traditional and social systems, in particular the tendency for communal 
tenures and livestock mobility. Individualization
5 and controlled stocking were the 
preferred solutions. These solutions were implemented by government agencies with 
support from the World Bank and bilateral agencies. They failed:  Degradation was not 
halted, livestock numbers did not decline and individualization resulted in loss of rights 
for vulnerable groups and individuals. It increased stratification and inequalities in 
pastoral societies. Individualization weakened established norms and rules for the 
regulation of pasture use, and opened up customary land to non-traditional users who 
were not tied by those customary norms and rules. 
As indicated in the previous section, the relevance of this conventional thinking 
that was informed by notions of ecosystem equilibrium, pastoral irrationality and 
                                                 
5. A number of people (e.g. Leach and Mearns 1996) use the term privatization to include private ownership 





Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons thesis now stands challenged. A cross section of 
scholars have demonstrated that pastoral strategies of herd diversity, flexibility, mobility 
are rational and crucial for survival in erratic environments (Lamprey and Reid 2004; 
Niamir-Fuller 1998,1999a; Scoones 1994; Behnke and Kerven 1993; McCabe 1990; 
Westoby et al 1989; Ellis and Swift 1988; Baxter and Hogg 1987) 
The review by Fratkin and Mearns (2003) point to the following as possible 
solutions to increased tenure insecurities faced by pastoralists in eastern Africa: 
1.  Herders’ rights to resources must be guaranteed by law in different forms of 
collective tenures; 
2.  A recognition of customary tenures; 
3.  The development of appropriate forms of conflict mediation and resolution to 
support mobility and opportunism; and  
4.  Devolution of power to appropriate authorities at different scales, particularly 
to empower herder groups to create and re-create rules, within prescribed 
limits, as they learn. 
 
Sahelian pastoralists have not been spared the disruptions of state intervention (Le 
Meur 2002; Thebaud 2002; Engberg-Pedersen 2001; Thebaud and Batterbury 2001; 
Ngaido 1999). Another strategy that was pursued in many parts of Northern Africa and 
the Middle East was the nationalization of drylands. Governments were assumed better 
equipped to manage range resources that were rapidly declining due to agricultural 
encroachment, increasing human and livestock populations and subsequent 
individualization. Although some successes with co-management can be observed, 
nationalization also led to widespread land appropriation, vegetation decline and 
shrinkage of grazing resources, as well as conflicts between the state and pastoral 




Because mobility and management of common pool resources were not addressed 
in official rangeland management systems, herders could not and cannot secure formal 
rights to pastures and resources (Thebaud and Batterbury 2001). In the Djerma region of 
SW Niger for example, Fulani agropastoralists do not have land rights despite 40 years of 
cultivation, because herding is still not recognized as a legitimate form of land use 
relative to farming. Pastoral lands are usually vested in the state, which allocates and 
defines use rights, and penalizes transgressions. This creates considerable uncertainty for 
pastoralists.  
In the Sahelian drylands resource tenure and access issues also occur over access 
to water resources. While water access has been a subject of competition among pastoral 
groups, traditional water wells have less been the object of contention compared to the 
recently state-constructed cement-lined wells (Thebaud and Batterbury 2001). In Eastern 
Niger, for example, the Fulbe retain priority rights to traditional wells, but do not 
establish exclusive rights. They allow outsiders rights to water based on principles of 
reciprocity with rules regulating length of visit, quantity of fodder resources to be 
consumed, and health status of animals. Outsiders that are unable to reciprocate must 
compensate for water access in other ways.  However, a lack of established rules around 
public wells and boreholes in the Dila region has created an arena for forceful conflict 
between Fulani and other groups. 
In sum, in the Sahel, the use of pastoral resources is based on a complex set of 
temporary or more permanent claims on pastures, wells and other resources (salt licks, 
for example), and on underlying principles of flexibility and reciprocity (Thebaud and 




territorial boundaries should remain fuzzy and negotiation over access should remain a 
permanent process in which individuals or user groups re-evaluate their share of pastoral 
resources and their particular level of control over strategic resources
6. Bruce and Mearns 
(2002) and Batterbury and Warren (2001) reiterate the importance of recognizing 
common property regimes that are based on mobility, and a concomitant requirement for 
more forums for negotiation (Bruce and Mearns 2002; Batterbury and Warren 2001).  
Cultivators and Farmers in the Drylands 
The production environment for drylands cultivators is one of high variability. 
Drylands farmers are mostly small holders, often on low potential land and heavily reliant 
on rainfed farming systems producing for local consumption and some markets. Like 
pastoralists, they adopt flexible strategies to cope with the uncertain conditions in which 
they operate. For example, crops are planted later and later for returns towards the onset 
of the dry season, a time when farmers had traditionally released farmland and crop 
stubble to livestock grazing. In addition, although drylands cultivators are usually located 
close to water resources (rivers, wells, reservoirs), they often scatter their plots to 
maximize the benefits of different production niches within the drylands landscape.  
Thus both pastoral and agro-pastoral and farming systems exist in the drylands, 
often engaging similar opportunistic strategies to address similar constraints imposed by 
the risky environments that they share. In the Sahel, for example, strong interactions 
developed between agriculturalists and pastoralists over time. While pastoralism 
dominates in a large part of the Northern zones of the Sahel, the entire southern and less 
                                                 
6 Whereas mobility is crucial as a management strategy for pastoralists to cope with risk, research has also 
shown that levels of investment to improve pasture management are lower where property rights are not 
clearly defined (Goodhue, McCarthy, and Di Gregorio, 2005). These findings indicate that there are trade-




arid zone is given to agriculture. This southern zone has for a long time received 
transhumant pastoralists from the north and has sheltered more or less sedentary agro-
pastoralists whose lands interpenetrate with those of peasant villages. Starting from the 
1950s-60s, following a slight increase in precipitation, these reciprocal arrangements are 
on the decline as farming communities diversify into livestock ownership and pastoralists 
began to engage in farming (Raynaut 2001; Thebaud and Batterbury 2001; Hoffman 
2004). By keeping more livestock than in the past, farmers are less dependent on the 
pastoral provision of animals and animal products (Hoffman 2004). At the same time 
imports of cheap meat has reduced farmers’ dependence on local meat, and are 
undermining the ability of herders to sell the produce.
7 Also, because tenure rules favor 
cropland above rangeland, the farmers have increased private pressure on resources by 
encroaching on common property rangelands, and by preventing others from using 
seasonal common property resources. Consequently, pastoralists are confronted with a 
severe decline in rangeland. In Northern Nigeria for example Fulani pastoralists are faced 
with up to 8-10 percent decline in their rangelands following the appropriations by Hausa 
farmers and Fulani agropastoralists (Hof 2001 cited in Hoffman 2004). Similar processes 
of range enclosure are also occurring in Niger (Vedeld 1996) and in Senegal (Thebaud et 
al. 1995). 
In some areas of Nigeria, though conflict may have escalated to violent 
proportions, villages and communities are developing internal rules of conflict resolution 
with regard to access to common resources. Each of the local governments has 
established a Farmer–Fulani Dispute Resolution Committee for the prevention or 
resolution of disputes between farmers and herders (Hoffman 2004). Stubble grazing and 
                                                 




manure arrangements between herders and farmers are being revitalized and cooperating 
between farmers and herders is increasing. However, this is more effective at the level of 
contracting individuals.  
In other parts of Africa traditional systems of negotiation and conflict resolution 
continue to function, as is the case of the Nuer of Sudan, for example (Duany 1999). 
Although the northern government disbanded earlier traditional authority structures for 
conflict resolution, agents with limited authority still continue to resolve conflict between 
the groups using resources held in common. In the early 1990s a violent conflict between 
the two largest Nuer groups arouse over the rights to commonly used grazing and fishing 
grounds. A conference based on the traditional governing principles of the Nuer was 
organized and led to an agreement between the two groups. Such mechanisms exist in 
many other parts of Africa but are increasingly challenged by environmental change, 
migration, diversification, state intervention and conflicts.  
Raynaut (2001:17-18, emphasis added) summarizes the situation of drylands 
users, their interactions and relations to land and natural resources most cogently: 
 
“natural resource use in the drylands occurs within a shared space, which 
is subject to diverse strategies of control and appropriation. Nothing can 
be grasped about the current crisis without consideration of the rivalries 
that confront (and the alliances that unite) the many competitors and 
partners on the environmental scene. The notion of negotiation is essential 
in the setting up of “sustainable” relations between the different types of 
users and the environment.” 
 
 
3.  ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DRYLANDS TENURE REFORM  
The preceding review of drylands tenure issues in parts of Africa seems to suggest 




there seems to be a recognition that drylands resources must be secured for drylands users 
against some form of threat, often external and that some legal solution at multiple scales 
that is premised on local customary rules may be appropriate and effective in protecting 
group rights. This solution is informed by earlier top-down, state-led approaches of 
individualization or nationalization that not only undermined existing authority systems 
regulating resource access, but also opened up opportunities for non-customary users and 
immigrants to appropriate resources, even as some customary users were privileged over 
others (e.g. cultivators over pastoralists).  
However, in seeking legal solutions for recognition and strengthening of group 
rights, there is increasing empirical evidence that threats to tenure security may also 
originate from within the groups themselves. For instance, while the initial enclosure of 
the Maasai range in Kenya was motivated by a drive to secure Maasai land claims against 
unsanctioned appropriations by state and influential non-Maasai, the more recent 
individualization of group resources is partly driven by individuals’ need to secure their 
and their families’ claims against appropriation by influential individuals from within the 
community (Mwangi 2005a; b).  
Even though property rights might be vested in groups as corporate entities, the 
dilemma remains of how resources are to be allocated, accessed, used and managed 
within groups themselves. The rights of women are particularly vulnerable during such 
instances. Recent research in Burkina Faso, Niger and Ethiopia (McCarthy et al. 2004) 
suggests that where there is sustained intra-group cooperation in natural resources 
management, the likelihood of individual appropriation is greatly diminished. In a broad 




developing countries Bruce and Mearns (2002) suggest that protection for communities 
against land grabs by outsiders does not automatically protect individuals and households 
against abuses from within.  
Second, the previous review also reveals a strong support among researchers and 
practitioners for strengthening negotiation and conflict management amongst and across 
users of drylands resources. The precise nature of how recognition for customary law can 
be inscribed into national systems, or of how conflict management and negotiation 
systems can be strengthened and sustained is yet to be fully understood. While the clamor 
for conflict management or negotiation might be justifiably rooted in the search for 
secure access among and between groups of multiple users, it remains an ambiguous and 
dangerously apolitical notion. Peters (2002) encourages sensitivity to the limits of 
negotiability. Once differential power is factored into the analysis, negotiation may be yet 
another tool in the hands of the privileged to manipulate outcomes. In addition, 
strengthening institutions for the mediation of conflicting interests is not a feasible 
solution in circumstances where property regimes have developed under conditions of 
acute discrimination (Cousins 2002).   
Not all scholars advocate codification and adaptation of customary rules into 
statutory systems. A growing number in Africa and the West argue that because access to 
land and related resources in Africa is a function of human relationships, which are 
conditional and dynamic, ‘western’ notions of security are not entirely relevant. In fact 
the bewildering complexity of customary rights, often multiple, overlapping, temporary 
or permanent, deriving legitimacy from multiple authorities, depending on the function of 




2001; Vedeld 1996; Berry 1989; 1993; Shipton and Goheen 1992; Bromley 1989; 
Haugerud 1989; Okoth-Ogendo 1989).  The danger lies not only in bounding a fluid set 
of principles, but also in the risk of failing to capture the rights of ‘secondary’ users. Even 
the term ‘custom’ is itself subject to contestation and may not be entirely local (Shipton 
and Goheen 1992). The problem of who decides who are the legitimate resource 
claimants and who has the right to decide still remains (Leach et al. 1999). In any case 
the introduction of substantive laws and rules at national level is no guarantee for change 
of status, positions, behavior of individuals, and enforcement practices at local levels 
(Vedeld 1996). Community norms remain important, even where custom begins to 
change in response to economic pressures (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999). Though the 
policy prescription from this group of scholars is far from clear as resource tenures in 
Africa are a moving target, their objections compel a nuanced analysis of the realities of 
resource tenures and the risks of oversimplification, particularly if titling is considered as 
one of the ways of increasing tenure security. Lavigne-Dellville et al. (2002) suggest that 
the best solution would be to harmonize the different legal regimes, retaining the dynamic 
flexibility of local systems while building up a body of regulations. This can be done by 
making rights more secure by offering a range of solutions, making land tenure 
management a more local matter, and recognizing the legitimacy of existing rights. 
Ultimately, they argue that the only way forward is to achieve at least some degree of 
reconciliation between legitimacy, legality and actual practice. 
In this formulation, an assessment of the principles underpinning the constitution 
of order in customary and local systems, including judgments of fairness based on local 




procedure (i.e. procedural law), as against rules of rights (i.e. substantive law) (Vedeld 
1996). The former would specify an enabling framework in which conflicting and 
concerned parties could legitimately put forward their claims to a certain resource. This 
would include the identification and building of administrative or legal institutions which 
would handle such claims, the principles for judging between opposing claims, as well as 
procedures for enforcement. South Africa is currently struggling with this approach 
(Cousins 2002). Moreover, a shift from substantive to procedural law therefore has to go 
along with the separation of access (rights, ‘powers’) from control (authority) (Okoth-
Ogendo 1989) because structures of authority that may be established to guarantee rights 
or mediate conflicts cannot at the same time be the source of those rights as this opens the 
doors for abuse and arbitrary allocation of rights. Also work undertaken on the processes 
of water rights reforms (Bruns, Ringler, and Meinzen-Dick, forthcoming) indicates that 
timing and sequencing of reform efforts are crucial to success. Bruns, Ringler, and 
Meinzen-Dick (forthcoming) argue that to have legitimacy rights should be allocated to 
users after forums to negotiate agreements have been established and rules agreed upon 
that govern the process of rights allocation. Looking at the interface between customary 
and statutory (or formal) law, Burchi (2005) points out that reconciling those two legal 
systems requires time and a transition period, in which mechanisms are established that 
seek to prevent confrontation and settle disputes. 
Quite clearly, scholars have identified different ways of securing local rights by 
multiple resource users in the drylands. These solutions entail three fundamental 
elements: i) legal recognition of local rules, norms and principles granting legitimacy and 




levels to capture the range of rights and issues; and iii) processes of negotiation and 
conflict resolution are given a premium.  
This conversation may also benefit from an explicit framework and/or description 
of what constitutes security (and insecurity) of access under a broad range of settings, for 
different categories of users, or different resources at different times and scales.  
Seeking answers to the fundamental question of what security means, for whom, 
against what threats, in a multiple user setting, may well open up a range of useful policy 
options for securing land access rights. Unpacking tenure insecurity might illuminate how 
conflict mediation can be structured, but also provide clues on how powerful interests 
may be countered for the benefit of a wider segment of society. The notion of tenure 
niches (Bruce 2000/1) and the institutional analysis framework that considers actors, their 
incentives and resources (Ostrom 2005) is useful for such an exploration.  
As a starting point, resource niches within the drylands system may determine the 
types of threats that may occur. For example, resource niches of high economic value 
(e.g. pockets of high agricultural potential, underlying minerals, or wildlife conservation 
value), the state and other powerful external actors may set in motion ways of 
appropriating rights away from customary claimants. In other cases migrant communities 
long accommodated by host communities may, for various reasons, demand more 
permanent rights. Or, as is common in many pastoral areas, with population increase 
demands on resources jointly appropriated/shared with neighboring communities 
escalate, sometimes leading to violent conflict. Even within the household, a male 
household head may sell off parts of his family’s land claims without notifying his wife 




without, which local communities may or may not be equipped to deal with, depending 
on the local, institutional mechanisns they have evolved and the strength of these 
mechanisms relative to existing alternatives, the resources and experience they may have 
to thwart external threat. Because these these threats are different, with different 
implications for the bundles of rights for claimants,  the process of securing claims may 
look different for each. While some threats might require legal recognition at higher 
levels, others may not require the same level of intervention. Instead, more localized 
interventions may be designed to maintain flexible access to local resources by affected 
parties, thus avoiding blanket codification programs.  
Another important set of questions highlights the importance of local strategies to 
counter threats. How do people counter threats? What are salient, positive reactions as 
ways of securing rights? Are there efforts from within communities to strengthen existing 
or develop new collective management systems, and what are those efforts? Answers to 
these questions will lead to a better understanding of the ways and means to enforce 
equity considerations in the drylands. 
The next section outlines a series of tenure innovations that are currently being 
undertaken (or have been undertaken) in different parts of Africa in the past decade.  
 
 
4.  TENURE INNOVATIONS 
This section presents a series of recent innovations (that move away from formal 
titling programs) primarily in rural West Africa that are intended to secure rights. Two 
examples of individual and collective certification rights in urban areas are also provided. 




the urban examples are drawn from Payne 2002. While this is not an exclusive list it 
gives a general idea of the issues and questions that arise when dealing with land tenure 
systems in the drylands. 
 
Gestion des Terroirs Villageois 
The aim of this program is to transfer of control of land and resources to 
communities, defined as territories. Informal decision-making powers are vested in 
representative  village committees, to whom all land tenure concerns are directed. This is 
an approach that was adopted in West African countries from the mid-1980s and is well 
developed in Burkina Faso. Other countries that adopted the program include Senegal, 
Mali, Cote d’Ivoire and Niger. Premised on the notion that uncertain land rights have 
exacerbated land degradation, the program also emphasizes a redefinition of land rights 
and promotion of sustainable land management through the adoption of soil erosion 
control and soil fertility enhancement techniques. Because distinct spatial areas end up 
being controlled by village councils, the program is found to be most effective with 
nucleated agricultural communities at the expense of seasonally migrant pastoralists. It 
overlooks overlapping use by differentiated users (e.g. mobile or sedentary pastoralists) 
and that resources are often controlled by multiple and overlapping authorities. In 
addition, it does not take into account the possibility that economic and social activities 
of both pastoral population and settled villagers frequently reach beyond the boundaries 





Codification: integrating local rules into national legislation 
By investigating local practice, pastoralism and tree tenure, this innovation 
identifies local rules and practices and integrates them into legal texts, for example 
Niger’s Code Rurale. However, local practices are very diverse, dependent on local social 
and political history. Formalizing custom simplifies flexible and variable rules because 
rules are often meaningful only in relation to the institutions that define them. Failing to 
take diversity into account compromises legitimacy. 
Rural Land Tenure Plans 
This innovation involves the identification and mapping of all existing, locally 
recognized rights, without investigating their origins. It takes stock of all existing rights 
that have been agreed upon by parties at local levels. Legislative reform is then 
conducted to define land tenure categories, and to give legal status to local rights. Land 
tenure certificates are issued and may ultimately be converted to private title. This was 
started in the early 1990s in Cote d’Ivoire and extended to Guinea, Benin and Burkina 
Faso. Rural land tenure plans have faced the same difficulties as Gestion des Terroirs 
Villageois intervention: the problem of describing and mapping overlapping rights. 
Consequently often only land manager and farmers are considered rights holders under 
this approach, neglecting secondary rights.  
This is aimed at encouraging sustainable land management and to reduce the 
pressure for land clearance. Madagascar has implemented an innovative approach starting 
in 1996, where exclusive rights are granted to local communities, with the aim of 
securing local management of common property. This involves drawing contracts 




allows for the systematization of local negotiating procedures. However, the recognition 
of arrangements by central administration is essential for rules to be guaranteed.  
Making land transactions secure 
Tried in Guinea, this arrangement focuses on the procedures by which land rights 
are transferred. Rights are considered legitimate only if transferred by one who is 
empowered to do so. It involves the clarification of procedures for drawing and 
formalizing contracts in situations in which an individual grants all or part of the rights 
he/she holds over a given plot. While this innovation links local rules and national laws 
with less rigidity and captures the dynamic aspects of land tenure without claiming to 
cover all aspects of rights, it introduces a number of complications. For example, what 
types of transactions will be recognized? What clauses must be present in the contract? Is 
a written document necessary? What would be the legal status of such agreements? 
Land tenure observatories 
Mali has tried developing land tenure observatories are intended to establish the 
capacity to observe changes in land tenure to facilitate the implementation of a land 
charter. It involves multidisciplinary groups of researchers located in specific regions 
contributing detailed knowledge of local situations to the observatories, with the aim of 
providing support to people involved in land reform. This information is brought together 
prior to drafting legislation, thus creating an opportunity for establishing dialogue with 
those taking decisions. However, implementation proved difficult due to lack of 
leadership from government agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, and it was 




Concession of the Real Right to Use  
This innovation has been used to legalize settlement on urban public land in 
Recife and Porto Alegre in Brazil starting in the early 1990s (see Fernandes 2002). Public 
authorities concede rights to use land by issuing special contracts to individuals or to 
groups. Contracts vary between 5-10 years; they allow original beneficiaries to sell or 
rent to third parties as well as to make inter vivos transfers, and cannot be easily revoked. 
While it does not lead to full ownership it provides legal security of tenure to 
beneficiaries. Gender sensitivity is embraced as certificates are issued under names of 
both partners. Though generally liable to property tax, variants of the legislation can 
allow temporary or permanent exemptions. The program generates strong perceptions of 
security of tenure among beneficiaries. However residents don’t have full understanding 
of the nature, technicalities and implications of the Concession of the Real Right to Use. 
Moreover, the concessions have faced legal resistance by registering officers on technical 
grounds. 
Community Land Trusts  
The aim of community land trusts, adopted in urban Kenya in the early 1990s, is 
to minimize negative effects of land markets to the poor and to give local communities 
longer term control over use and future allocation of their land (see Yahya 2002). 
Committees are established to implement the land trusts at local, district and national 
levels, and seats are reserved for women on these committees. Members pay annual lease 
fees and absentee leases are disallowed. Community land trusts are registered under one 
title but also linked to separate law for registration of associations to ensure collective 
ownership. Members cannot sell their rights, though they can sell developments on their 




development on the land. Kenyan law recognizes individual titles and only very few 
individuals can be registered as joint owners. In addition officials in the Department of 
Lands are used to issuing title and are unfamiliar with crafting innovative tenure security 
mechanisms. Additional difficulties include opposition by youth to allocation of rights to 
tenants and the reality that some members cannot afford annual membership fees.  
This brief review of innovative and experimental approaches indicates that 
attempts at securing tenures through the adaptation and codification of customary rights 
confirms the fears of some scholars that such procedures would result in an 
oversimplification of rights at the local level. Codification programs including rural land 
tenure plans, which have been implemented in rural areas of Sahelian countries from the 
mid 1990s, have failed to take diversity of rights, including secondary rights, into 
account, severely compromising legitimacy. Unlike the urban programs, all are silent on 
the land rights of women and other marginalized groups. It may well be that codifying 
customary rights to land also codifies the power differentials that may be embedded 
within customary systems.
8 Because these codification and other programs in rural West 
Africa have failed to account for multiple, overlapping rights and diversity of land use, 
they have created unforeseen conflict.  Negotiation and conflict resolution (the current 
mantra in land and natural resources management) is at best a fuzzy, unimplemented 
notion in these innovations.  
In general the drive towards legal solutions and codification is grounded in the 
significant threat from external actors such as the state, which either appropriated or 
                                                 
8 Conversely, traditional understandings and norms in some West African groups may allow women certain 
privileges which codification may undo. For example, a woman may have use rights to the land of her 
family although she has married out of her village and does not live there anymore, hence codification 




reallocated lands that were originally under customary authority. As indicated in previous 
sections, it may well be time to reframe the question of tenure security for drylands 
resource users in order to promote a deeper understanding of the dilemma the drylands 
are facing. If legal regimes are necessary to guarantee the security of resource rights, at 
what scale would this be most effective without undermining the nature and content of 
rights, which are at once multiple and overlapping in time and space? Which rights must 
be codified and at what scale? Which sets of rights require formal recognition? What 
tenure options to address external and internal threats to rights and access? 
In calling for a focus on accountable, inclusive and transparent procedures for 
negotiating and arbitrating disputes at local levels some scholars provide an avenue out of 
the need to record and legalize all manner of rights. Focusing on procedures for 
negotiation and dispute resolution under a framework in which most or all complements 
of rights are guaranteed at higher scales will allow for local level negotiations based on 
local, salient values regarding what is fair and what is equitable.  
However, there is need to emphasize the limitations of negotiation processes that 
were pointed out earlier in this paper. Not only is there a risk of the elite capturing the 
negotiating process but in some instances negotiation may not be practicable either due to 
prior injustices or unequal capacities among negotiating parties (FAO 2005; Cousins 
2002; Peters 2002).  In such cases it is important to establish answers to the following 
questions: What is the bargaining power of each party? What are the capacities of the 
actors to negotiate? Who has control over information? What are the rules? How do those 
rules influence the outcomes in terms of access to resources? Careful answers to these 




differentiated actors at varying levels and scales, and how these limits might be 
meaningfully reduced by different actors, including state actors. Non governmental 
organizations have taken a lead role in facilitating negotiations among conflicting 
communities in West Africa (Moore 2004). The state’s theoretical role as the ultimate 
guarantor of property rights and arbiter of conflicts is fairly clear. Yet in practice the 
complement of institutions and actors that comprise the state have proved incapable (and 
perhaps unwilling) to perform this role effectively. Recent attempts at decentralizing 
authority and functions to local and district levels have remained incomplete, leading to a 
strengthening of local elites, and increased vulnerability of the already marginalized 
(Ribot 2004). A system of incentives is required to ensure that central and local 
institutions are more responsive and accountable to local populations as a whole. 
Institutional strength of the state is needed for effective mediation, without which there 
can be no consensus, and no general framework of dynamic relations between the actors 
in rural development (Paniagua-Ruiz 1996).  
The problem of securing rights for users in drylands areas is well reflected in 
processes of group ranch subdivision in Kenya’s Maasailand (Mwangi 2005b). While the 
creation of group ranches secured the substantive claims of individuals (i.e. men as 
household heads) in a corporate title, bureaucratic procedures for problem solving and 
resource allocation within the group ranch did not reflect local norms and decision 
making protocols. Majority voting replaced consensus-based decision making, while a 
formally elected committee replaced the council of elders in resource allocation 
decisions. Indeed the imposition of livestock quotas by the group ranch committee was 




is subject to control by individual owners. More importantly, the procedural rules that 
were crafted by government representatives (i.e. the Registrar of Group Ranches and his 
cohort of Land Adjudication Officers) that would oversee the subdivision process were 
not enforced by the state at the time of subdivision, even in the face of glaring 
inequalities in the outcomes of subdivision. The general point of this account of 
subdivision is to reiterate the need for procedural rules to reflect the needs and practices 
of local peoples, but also to stress the necessity of state enforcement.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to explore how tenure security concerns for multiple uses of 
drylands resources can be strengthened. A wide range of innovations in both rural and 
urban settings are currently under experimentation. Many of these are legal reforms that 
seek to adapt customary and local systems to wider statutory obligations. In the rural 
setting, dangers of simplifying complexities and the exclusion of secondary and 
temporary users are key concerns.
9 We have argued for a reexamination of the notion of 
tenure security as a way out of the cul de sac of blanket policies for securing rights at 
group and individual levels. Local actors themselves are the competent authorities to 
determine what forms of insecurities exist and what levels of action, drawing from the 
complement of institutions available, might alleviate these insecurities. Negotiated 
processes must have meaning in local settings, while elite influence must be confronted 
in strategic ways.  
 
                                                 
9 This is an ongoing debate also for other resources. For the discussion on water see the papers and 




This discussion has focused on Sub-Saharan Africa’s drylands with some 
examples from the Middle East and Northern Africa. But similar issues are pertinent in 
Asia and other parts of the world. Fernandez-Gimenez (2002) and Fratkins and Mearns 
(2003) have identified similar paradoxes in the rangelands of Mongolia, while Sneath 
(1993; 1998) and Banks (2004) have done so in China. There is a broad appreciation of 
the need (and urgency) to secure tenures in highly variable environments for its various 
multiple users. Best practices for achieving this enormous task will unfold with time, but 
also with learning from other similarly mobile resources. In water reform for instance, the 
introduction of simple rules instead of rushing to register substantive rights has been 
found to effectively serve the needs of multiple users (Steenbergen and Shah 2003). Here, 
reconstituting governance for water use and management comprises a whole set of 
interrelated, sequenced activities and obligations at constitutional, collective choice and 
operational levels (Bruns, Ringler, and Meinzen-Dick 2005). This work also shows that 
efforts to reform rights systems may yield little benefit if pushed too soon, too quickly, or 
without appropriate synchronization between different components of institutional 
change but that they will be more effective if applied with realistic patience, timing that 
matches local priorities, and schedules that allow continuous learning and integration 
between changes in policy, regulation, and practice. 
The review suggests that any attempt to support tenure policies aimed at 
sustainable drylands development has to focus on reconciling legitimacy, legality and 
practice of tenure rights. To create legitimacy on the ground, dialogue and negotiation 
among resource users need to be promoted and supported. This would work best within a 




the local people themselves enabling them to adapt their local systems to the specific 
external and internal threats to tenure security. Law would thus set the principles and 
procedures of negotiation and dialogue for them to be accountable, transparent and 
inclusive. Even then, the state would need to function as a capable mediator and enforcer. 
Of course, the expectation that a state which has created considerable land tenure 
insecurity would turn around and perform its functions is open to criticism. Yet many 
strong and capable states have safeguarded, secured and guaranteed property rights in the 
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